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JAN SOWA
The Essentialist Masturbation: 
Can the Global East Get any Satisfaction?
While agreeing with Martin Müller’s intent of filling the gap 
in contemporary social sciences that the lack of interest in 
the Global East constitutes, the article engages in polemics with 
solution postulated by Müller. The Author argues for a 
conceptualization of the Global East that would not be based 
on its essence, but rather on its place in the global division of 
labor. The “strategic essentialism” postulated by Müller is 
refuted for three reasons: a reactionary character of identity 
politics as such, its capture by the Right and doubtful value 
of socio-cultural identity of most societies of Global East. 
Instead an alter-universalism is proposed that would be 
different from the colonial universalism of the West and 
focused on constructing a common front of progressive-
-emancipatory struggles.
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There’s a bunch of proverbial anecdotes that you can hear every now 
and then among East European social scientists: ask an average person 
in “the West”, where the center of Europe is – a French person would 
point to Lyon, a German will hesitate between Frankfurt-on-Men and 
Nurnberg, while a Brit would probably believe it is – alas! – in Brussels. 
In Poland many hold that the geographical center of Europe is near 
Łódź and even if it is not a universally accepted fact, this instance of 
Polish patriotism is, surprisingly, closer to truth than what “people in 
the West” claim. Ask the same people what the biggest ethno-linguistic 
group in Europe is. A French person could reply that the Romance 
peoples (those speaking Roman languages deriving from Latin), a Swede 
would hold that it’s the Scandinavians, while for a Brit it would be 
Anglo-Saxon. As a matter of fact, the Slavs are the biggest.
Anecdotes like these and many others provoke a mix of disbelief in 
Western ignorance and a resentment that has become more and more 
articulate in Eastern Europe: so here we are, the biggest ethnic group in 
the center of Europe and... and nothing. These are a popular, unsophi-
sticated symptoms of the same problem that animates Müller’s article 
In Search of the Global East: Thinking between North and South: there are 
big chunks of land, populated by large groups of people with their own 
unique cultures (“culture” here is understood in practical terms, as a sha-
red way of life) that seem to occupy at best a marginal place in the 
imagination of privileged groups inhabiting “the West”, “the North”, 
“the center”, “the developed countries” “the first world” or whatever you 
want to call the countries belonging to the core of the capitalist world-
-economy. What is sometimes referred to as “the East” (or “former East”) 
provides us with a paradigmatic – even if not the one and only – exam-
ple of such a “twilight zone” of the global imagination: a place everyone 
knows exists, but very few can say anything more than that.
There should be no disagreement with Müller that the geographi-
cal terms we are using to denote various “zones” or “spheres” are impre-
cise at best and misleading at worst: the global East would not be in 
the East only, just as the global North is also... in the south, like 
Australia. Obviously, patterns of social differentiation, though not 
completely detached from physical and spatial arrangements, do not 
follow neat geometrical divisions. The distribution of a given group 
always responds in some way to the immediate surrounding environ-
ment, but is also shaped by processes and factors that are of human 
making themselves. A great example is provided by James C. Scott in 
his investigation of Zomia, a mountainous zone of South-East Asia 
that was historically shaped by exodus from large state machines in 
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the lowlands. As Scott demonstrates, the spatial distribution of various 
tribes and groups seems to be bizarre and senseless when looked only 
in the horizontal dimension, as if people inhabited chaotic chunks of 
land whose shapes bring to mind rather Rorschach’s test than any 
meaningful boundaries of any social entity. It looks very differently 
though when analyzed in the vertical dimension: it turns out that the 
given group inhabits lands laying at a certain altitude, which they 
settled when fleeing from the oppressive state apparatus controlling 
the valleys (for obvious reasons, the state likes flat areas, as it makes 
control, supervision and circulation much easier) (Scott 2009: 40–63). 
Thus although “territory” as a term evokes rather horizontal distribu-
tion, the territorial arrangements of Zomia are mainly operational in 
the vertical dimension, and their geographic logic is shaped much 
more by social than geometric circumstances. This is a typical example 
of the social production of space that has been explored by many 
authors in various domains, especially in the field of urban studies.
Thus if we want to understand the curious and problematic fate of 
the Global East, we need to think beyond geography and turn towards 
more systemic or structural explanations. The approach put forward by 
so-called dependency or system theories is an attempt to engage precisely 
at this point. Müller refers to Immanuel Wallerstein, but there are other 
theorists: Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank or – from the younger 
generation – Jason W. Moore. Of course, although the trichotomy of 
“center – semi-periphery – periphery” has many downsides, it remains 
the most elaborate and advanced shot at explaining the current fate of 
humanity in a manner that is both interconnected and critical. The fact 
that the structure does not mirror geography does not seem puzzling at 
all for the system/dependency approach, as “periphery” is more of a struc-
tural position than a spatial relation. This kind of approach that inhe-
rently and purposefully reveals hierarchizations and that diagnoses ine-
qualities seems to be better poised for explaining the status quo than 
post-structuralist theories that stress horizontal dispersion, diversity and 
interconnectivity, like the ANT paradigm, for example. For a very sim-
ple reason: these hierarchies and inequalities constitute the absolute key 
element of the conundrum that we need to explain: the problem of the 
Global East is not to acknowledge its existence and affirm its unique 
identity in the horizontal plethora of cultures and societies, but to con-
ceptually grasp its inferior status. Critical evaluation is necessary just for 
merely posing the problem and understanding it.
Another major advantage of adopting an approach similar to the 





East with the dynamics of capitalism (in Early Modern times it was the 
first “Third World”, since it provided raw materials, unprocessed goods 
and indirectly added cheap, unskilled labor to the production chains in 
the capitalist world-economy). This does not explain everything when 
it comes to the particular state of the societies of the Global East (I’ll 
return to this point later), but attempts at completely eradicating this 
materialist perspective are doomed to fail. The historical dynamics of 
the capitalist economy might not have been the only factor shaping 
global divisions, however, it has been constantly present and always 
exerting influence on every single human society in recent centuries. It 
is intriguing, for example, that the emergence of global electronic com-
munication, which was supposed to be such a disruptive and revolutio-
nary factor, has not reshaped the global redistribution of resources in 
any important way. It is not by accident that the major share of the 
profits generated by the digital economy are accumulating where capi-
tal was accumulating before: in the rich areas of the core economies like 
the US, Japan or Western Europe, and not in Mongolia or Chad. Free, 
uncontrolled communication has not generated a more diverse and 
balanced semiotic landscape but rather contributed to levels of centra-
lization and standardization hitherto unseen in the history of humanity: 
a handful of companies – almost all of which are uniquely located on 
the West Coast of the US, with the leading five being Microsoft, Google, 
Facebook, Amazon and Apple – are the conduits of communication, 
labor and leisure for half (or even more) of the world population. Every 
time anyone uses a smartphone, makes an internet search, sends an email 
or accesses pornography, the profits accumulate in very narrow zones of 
the highly developed economies of the global North. The center-peri-
phery divide is articulated more clearly than ever before, despite the 
celebrations of horizontal rhizomes so popular in progressive academic 
circles. 
While material conditions are always there, and always intervene in 
any human practice (and in this sense materialism constitutes an unsur-
passable perspective in the human and social sciences), of course the 
economic perspective does not explain everything, all the time. Müller 
is right that in order to understand the fate of the East we need to address 
its particular circumstances and not only universal material forces. Once 
we do this, the picture becomes more complicated; that which seems to 
belong to the same category of rather neglected than dominated socie-
ties (which differentiates, according to Müller, the Global East from the 
postcolonial Global South) turns out to be very different in its particu-





local vs the global. One case that I have examined very closely is that of 
Central-Eastern Europe being different from both the West and the East 
(mainly Russia) (Sowa 2011). The debate about “going with the West 
or sticking with our own culture”, which Clifford Geertz (1993) labeled 
as the conflict between “epochialism” (let’s go with the Zeitgeist of the 
epoch) and “essentialism” (let’s cultivate our unique, authentic identity 
regardless of what is going on elsewhere) was the very core of the debate 
between Westernism and Slavophilia in the Russian civilizational zone 
for much of the 19th and part of the 20th century. Poland, dominated 
by Russia until 1918, took part in these debates, however it was virtually 
impossible for Polish intellectuals to assume any positions in a meaning-
ful way, since for Poland both eventualities entailed some kind of sub-
jugation: to the West in the first instance or to Russia in the second. 
Thus, although both Poland and Russia seem to belong to the same 
category of the Global East (which is confirmed not only by their geo-
graphical proximity, but also by their shared experience of most of the 
20th century events, such as the October Revolution, the Second World 
War, Bolshevik rule, and the transformation of the 1990s), their situation 
is very different. For complex historical reasons, Russia, with its recent 
and splendid imperial past, can reflect upon autonomy and authenticity, 
while Poland can only choose who will dominate it. So, obviously the 
very same heterogeneity that complicates neat divisions into the Center 
and the Peripheries also destabilizes the category of Global East. On the 
other hand, the core problem on the social and cultural level seems to 
be exactly the same as what the system theory diagnoses as the main 
economic obstacle: dependency. One of the key features of the Global 
East is its inability to assume its own and autonomous position. The 
Global South, although poorer, seems to be in a better situation in this 
respect because it is much further away from the dominating metropo-
litan areas, not only in terms of physical space, but mainly due to cul-
tural affiliations (Kiossev 1999). The post-colonial, peripheral South is 
the “poor Other”, while we, the Eastern Europeans, are the “poor Same”, 
and as such we are ultimately unattractive: poor and un-sexy (because 
not exotic and different enough).
I believe it is symptomatic (and a very good thing) that voices like 
Martin Müller’s are becoming more and more articulate. Recent decades 
have brought a very mixed blessing to what we may provisionally label 
the Global East. When you look at the economic statistics, we are doing 
well or even very well – when it comes to Poland, for example, the 2020 
coronavirus crisis broke almost three decades of constant, uninterrupted 
GDP growth, which is an amazing achievement on any scale, be it 
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European or global. On the other hand, there is a widespread sense of 
defeat, resentment, disappointment and frustration, and other similar 
affects in Polish society. Apparently, the Global East can’t get no satis-
faction. Many find it puzzling that a booming economy goes hand in 
hand with such a lack of contentment. A Marxist finds it less surprising: 
the belief that smooth-functioning capitalism solves all problems is the 
key part of ideological screen of phantasy that capitalism builds to hide 
a much more inconvenient truth. But it goes further than that. What 
animates the right-wing populist revolt is a “What-the-Fuck???” kind 
of fury that is animated precisely by a feeling of inferiority, unimportance 
and lack of recognition. As was diagnosed by Martin Müller, the Global 
Eastern condition means that we went through painful economic 
reforms, we adjusted our institutions to the Western standard to be able 
to join the EU, we patiently went through humiliations of the so-called 
“accession process” when we were told by Western leaders like Jacques 
Chirac that our best option is to shut-up and not to comment on inter-
national policies adopted by Western powers. At the same time, we have 
achieved a brilliant macroeconomic success (or at least that’s what the 
official propaganda says), we have the deepest diving pool and the big-
gest amusement park in Europe, and now are even building the highest 
building in the EU—but still, they (i.e. “the West”) do not love us! They 
either remain ignorant of us and our great achievements (just think of 
Chopin – yes, he was Polish! – or Marie Curie – yes, she was Polish! – or 
John Paul II – at least everybody knows he was Polish!) or they actively 
affirm our civilizational inferiority, treating us only as a source of cheap 
labor (just think of “Polish plumber” in France, or the entire army of 
Polish migrant workers who constitute nowadays the biggest foreign-
-born group on the British Isles)1. 
Ironically, and deconstructibly, it needs to be acknowledged that our 
“achievements” in the last decades are intimately linked with our “failu-
res’”: it is precisely the way we won our “prosperity” and “freedom” that 
is the source of our malaise and our unsatisfied need for recognition: 
we have done it by imitating. After all we just copied everything – our 
institutions were modeled after the Western liberal democracies, our 
laws were adjusted to EU standards, our economic transformation of 
the 1990s was designed by Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton along the 
lines of the so-called Washington Consensus, we built malls and highways 
1 By the way, it could be interesting to compare the discourse about “the 
West” of Polish right-wing populists and the German AFD – most likely they 
would share a lot of similarities.
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“just like the West” and our popular culture neatly imitated the Western 
(mainly American) model. This giant exercise in imitation was justified 
by the sociological thought of the time, namely the so-called moderni-
zation theory that affirmed it was normal and beneficial for some to lead 
and others to follow. Nevertheless imitation, as was recently argued and 
analyzed in detail by Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes (2020), is a very 
tricky procedure – being a Xerox boy may allow you to succeed (after 
all, the history of life on Earth as such is a string of imitations and 
usurpations), but the amount of recognition and satisfaction (or jouis-
sance if you want to put it in a more elaborate way) it can provide is very 
limited. Especially nowadays, when the hysteria of internet celebrity 
culture made everyone eager to be recognized for what they are (both 
left and right agree on that, differing only in their opinions of what 
should be an acceptable source of pride: one’s suffering and subjugation, 
combined with impeccable moral virtue, for left-wing identity politics; 
and tradition, combined with once’s particular culture, for right-wing 
identity politics).
The crucial question remains: What do we do with it all? Martin 
Müller also asks this question, citing Gayatri Spivak’s concept of “stra-
tegic essentialism” as the answer. It’s here that I rather disagree. For three 
reasons. Firstly, the practical effects of the essentialist-identitarian turn 
of critical theory and activism are really regrettable. It has taken us to 
a painful cul-de-sac of identity politics that makes linking our struggles 
more and more difficult2. Everyone wants to talk only about themselves 
and their particular predicaments; as a result, essentialist divisions have 
become unsurmountable frontiers pitching various subjugated groups 
against one another. Secondly, the tools and strategies of identity politics 
have been appropriated by the right. Right-wing populism is identity 
politics of the white. Fighting political, social and economic oppression 
with such tools nowadays is like organizing a marketing campaign to 
advertise the end of capitalism. The more success we have talking about 
our particular suffering and advancing our particular grievances the 
more attractive it becomes for the right to talk about their suffering and 
their particular grievances. It ends with Charlottesville and Portland: 
a bunch of the so-called white-trash and poor people of color killing 
one another while Wall Street thrives (or in another context: Hindu and 
Muslims aiming at mutual extermination while their land gets devoured 
by international capital). Don’t get me wrong: struggle is necessary and 
2 For an inspiring analysis of Black Lives Matter movement in this perspec-
tive, see Johnson 2017.
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legitimate, revolt is absolutely essential, antagonism is unavoidable, but 
a combination of essentialism and antagonism ends not with a revolu-
tionary movement but with fascism. Marx claims that the proletariat is 
the revolutionary class, because, unlike the bourgeoisie, the aristocracy 
and all other classes before it, it aims not at remodeling the whole of 
society after itself (so that everyone should be a proletarian), but at such 
a structural transformation that would eliminate the position of the 
proletariat altogether. There is no room for essentialism here, no affir-
mation of the sanctity of labor, the worker’s identity etc. Actually, such 
an attempt at “strategic essentialism” also happened within the workers 
movement and it gave birth to pathetic and corrupt syndicalism that 
was challenged by the workers themselves in the 1960s and 1970s (it is 
symptomatic that the biggest French trade union CGT chose to support 
de Gaulle against the revolt in May 1968). That’s precisely where “stra-
tegic essentialism” ends: with essential strategic failure.
There is yet another obstacle — maybe the biggest one — in resor-
ting to strategic essentialism when it comes to the Global East: is there 
really so much of essence in the societies of this zone, and is it enough 
for any viable alternative to be built on it? Being a member of such 
a society I strongly doubt it. It has become fashionable to act along the 
lines of epistemic justice and to look for solutions to our problems in 
the so-called indigenous knowledges. For sure, there are valuable insights 
to be found there but  “indigenous=valuable” is hardly a general rule. 
In most parts, traditions tend to be fundamentally problematic while 
essentialism always needs to rely on the past (the essence of every cul-
tural and social identity is, after all, shaped by past events and interac-
tions). These pasts do not offer us enough to construct any meaningful 
strategy in any aspect, not even one of symbolic recognition and attrac-
tiveness. All they may offer is some sort of consolation: we know how 
great and morally impeccable we are! That is, however, a socio-political 
equivalent of masturbation – if nobody wants to have sex with you, you 
can always jerk-off. As long as you enjoy it, it is perfectly OK. However 
building lasting relationships based on masturbation does not seem to 
be the best possible idea.
 What other option do we have? Trying to be faithful to the best 
traditions of critical thought and action, I’d say the very same one as 
those who struggled before us: to look for some kind of universalism in 
the practical form of internationalism. I understand that the very term 
“universalism”, along with “modernity” or “reason”, is unacceptable for 
the mainstream of contemporary critical theory, which is still shaped, 
much more than is acknowledged, by the central tenets of post-struc-
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turalism. A lot of criticism directed towards them is entirely legitimate 
and, of course, there can be no going back to any kind of colonial 
universalism. But just as there is alter-modernity – a minoritarian current 
that can be traced back to Spinoza and radical enlightenment – and 
anti-capitalist struggles undertaken over centuries can be understood as 
attempts to counter the fatal elements of capitalist modernity not with 
an anti-modern, but with an alter-modern project, there may also be 
a possibility for what we may label as “alter-universalism”, or for a “uni-
versalism of the subaltern”. The pertinent observation made by Martin 
Müller that the Global East is not only in the geographical East, can be 
a perfect starting point for building such an alter-universalism. So the 
question would not be how the East can fight against the West, but how 
people in the East and in the West can fight together against forces, 
institutions and arrangements that are detrimental for all of us, no 
matter what our skin color, gender or sexual orientation is. This new 
universalism of the subaltern is what the political meaning of “Global 
East” may become.
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Tytuł: Esencjalistyczna masturbacja: Czy Globalny Wschód może zaznać satysfak-
cji?
Abstrakt: Zgadzając się z postulowanym przez Martina Müllera uzupełnieniem luki 
we współczesnych naukach społecznych, jaką stanowi niewielkie zainteresowanie 
kondycją Globalnego Wschodu, artykuł podejmuje polemikę z zaproponowanym 
przez niego rozwiązaniem owego problemu. Autor proponuje spojrzenie na Globalny 
Wschód nie w kategoriach esencjalistycznych, ale poprzez pryzmat jego miejsca 
w międzynarodowym podziale pracy. „Strategiczny esencjalizm”, za którym opowiada 
się Müller, jest zdaniem Autora błędny ze względu na trzy związane z nim problemy: 





prawicowe oraz wątpliwą wartość sporej części rozwiązań społeczno-kulturowych 
stanowiących historyczną tożsamość społeczeństw Globalnego Wschodu. Zamiast 
tego tekst proponuje konstrukcję alter-uniwersalizmu, który dystansowałby się od 
uniwersalizmu kolonialnego Zachodu, koncentrując się na budowie wspólnego 
frontu walk postępowo-emancypacyjnych.
Słowa kluczowe: Globalny Wchód, polityka tożsamości, kapitalistyczny system-
-świat, esencjalizm, uniwersalizm, polityka postępowa, polityka rewolucyjna
